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This paper discusses recent issues in the regulation of the retail securities and investments 
industry, written for and from the perspective of an industrial organization economist.  It 
reviews the sources of market failure that create an economic rationale for regulation and 
provides a brief overview of the laws and institutions that comprise modern securities 
regulation.  It then turns to three recent issues with parallels in other industries:  the 
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1.  Introduction 
The stock market bubble of the 1920s was accompanied by questionable conduct 
by security issuers, underwriters, brokers, and investment companies.  Stock in sham 
companies was issued and pushed on novice investors by aggressive stock brokers, and 
the prospects of established firms were knowingly exaggerated.
2  Shareholders in 
investment companies had their assets diluted by self-dealing managers.
3  The 
subsequent crash motivated the creation of the institutions and laws that form the core of 
modern U.S. financial regulation. 
History has to some extent repeated itself, albeit on a smaller scale.  A set of 
abuses by accountants, equity analysts, brokers, and investment companies during the 
market boom in the late 1990s has motivated a major new law (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002), new rulemaking by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and newly 
vigorous enforcement of existing laws and rules by the SEC and other regulators.  It also 
led to a surge in interest in further refining financial regulation, especially among 
generalists.  As a crude proxy of generalist interest, Figure 1 plots mentions of the phrase 
“Securities and Exchange Commission” in the New York Times.  Mentions spiked with 
the collapse of Enron in late 2001 to levels not seen since the 1930s, and they remained at 
high levels for about four years. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
                                                 
2  For example, in the conference report accompanying the 1933 Securities Act, the House of 
Representatives (1933, p. 2) claims that “fully half or $25,000,000 worth of securities floated during this 
period [the decade following World War One] have been proved to be worthless.”  While this is a claim 
about the ex post value of these securities after the 1929-33 market decline, it clearly reflects a belief that 
many of these securities were of questionable value ex ante.  
3  See Baumol, et. al. (1990) and Securities and Exchange Commission (1992) for more details. 
2     
This chapter reviews the regulation of the U.S. retail securities and investments 
industry from the perspective of an industrial organization economist.  It discusses the 
economic rationale for regulation, the institutions and laws that emerged after the 1929 
crash, and then turns to a discussion of more current issues.  Given the vastness of the 
field, this discussion is focused on three issues with parallels in other industries:  the 
regulation of pricing, antitrust, and firm boundaries and their implications for conflicts of 
interest.
4
The remainder of the chapter is outlined as follows.  Section 2 discusses the scope 
and economic size of the retail securities and investments industry, while Section 3 
discusses the underlying reasons why it might require regulation.  Section 4 provides a 
brief overview of the main institutions and laws, while Sections 5-7 discuss the three 
current issues outlined above.  A conclusion follows. 
 
2.  Size and scope of the retail securities industry 
Financial services, broadly construed, are a larger piece of the economy than 
many economically literate Americans realize.  Most regular newspaper readers are 
aware that U.S. health care expenditures are about 15 percent of GDP and that this ratio is 
about 1.5 times higher than in other advanced countries (OECD, 2005).  This figure is the 
centerpiece of an active debate about the extent to which it reflects high quantity and 
quality, high prices and economic rents, or waste. 
                                                 
4  Readers interested in a more comprehensive survey of the field are referred to Seligman (2003) or the 
legal textbook Coffee and Seligman (2002).  Baumol, et. al. (1990) and Securities and Exchange 
Commission (1992) also provide histories of investment management regulation.  Goshen and Gideon 
(2004) and Kitch (2004) provide complementary reviews of current issues in financial regulation. 
3 Fewer are aware that the corresponding figures for financial services are about as 
high.  Because financial services are an intermediate good as well as a final good, a direct 
comparison of expenditure data is not meaningful.  Table 1 reports that gross value added 
of the financial intermediation sector (which includes banking, insurance, and securities) 
is 8.1 percent of GDP for the U.S. and an average of 5.1 percent in the rest of the G-7.  
For comparison, gross value added figures for “health and social work” are provided.  
Gross value added excludes purchases of materials, services, and capital equipment, and 
so these figures are not directly comparable to the more commonly quoted expenditure 
data, but they do suggest that finance and health care are roughly comparable in size. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
An alternative measure of the sector’s size is provided by revenue data from the 
2002 Economic Census.  The total revenue of the financial intermediation sector in 2002 
is $2.7 trillion, or about 25 percent of GDP (Table 2).  This figure includes both revenue 
from interest on loans and double counts revenue from intermediate goods and services, 
so it may overstate the size of the sector.  The Economic Census data show that the sector 
accounts for 12.8 percent of revenue, 10 percent of payroll, and 6 percent of employment 
reported in all industries.  The last two ratios do not suffer from double counting and the 
first includes it in both numerator and denominator, so these are probably better 
indicators of its share in the economy.  The conclusion that the sector is about as large as 
health care still seems at least roughly valid. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Of the $2.7 trillion in revenue reported in the Census, about $400 billion falls into 
the scope of this chapter:  securities and investment products purchased by (but not 
4 necessarily exclusively by) retail investors.  The activities of this industry can be roughly 
thought of as a value chain with four steps (Figure 2).  First, securities are underwritten 
and distributed to their initial owners, for example, through an initial public offering 
(IPO).  Second, securities are traded on secondary markets by both proprietary traders 
and brokers acting as agents for either individual investors or portfolio managers.  Third, 
many securities are purchased and held by investment products such as mutual funds or 
variable annuities.  Fourth, the investment products are sold to retail investors by 
financial advisors, brokers, banks, insurance agents, or mutual fund companies.  In some 
cases, stages of the process are bypassed.  For example, some investors bypass stages 3 
and 4 by purchasing securities directly through discount brokers, or bypass stage 3 but 
not 4 by purchasing securities on the advice of a full-service broker.  Likewise, some 
investors bypass stage 4 by buying investment products such as mutual funds directly 
from the fund’s manager.  Investors and investments funds also often bypass stage 2 by 
investing directly and holding new issues, especially for bonds with illiquid secondary 
markets.  Even given these exceptions, the four-stage value chain is a useful organizing 
framework, particularly given that, as discussed below, laws, rulemaking, and regulatory 
bodies are organized around this delineation of activities.   
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Table 3 provides a product level breakdown of revenue accounted for by 
commercial banks and securities firms in 2002.
5  The origination of securities accounted 
for $18.8 billion in revenue, which is primarily divided among investment banking ($11.7 
                                                 
5  Insurance companies also offer products with investment characteristics.  A variable annuity is an 
investment product in its accumulation stage, while fixed annuities and whole life insurance also have 
investment aspects to them.  Total annuity revenue for insurance establishments in 2002 was approximately 
$200 billion, but since this could not be separated into variable and fixed annuities, I exclude it from the 
revenue figures in this section. 
5 billion), commercial banking ($4.4 billion), and brokerage ($2.4 billion) establishments.
6  
Proprietary trading yielded $40.9 billion, with commercial and investment banking 
establishments each accounting for about $17.5 billion.  The profitability of proprietary 
trading, particularly by entities engaged in other client business, is a recent source of 
concern for regulators, for reasons discussed more below.  Brokerage and related 
products such as investment research accounted for $201 billion in revenue, although less 
than half of this was earned by brokerage establishments, with commercial and 
investment banking establishments dividing the other half roughly evenly.  Asset 
management and financial planning accounted for $138 billion.  Both managing a 
collective investment vehicle such as a mutual fund and providing investment advice to 
an individual investor are regarded “investment advice,” and revenues from the two 
sources are not distinguished in the Economic Census.  Of the $138 billion, $71 billion is 
earned by establishments engaged in portfolio management or investment banking 
establishments, while the remaining $67 billion is earned by investment advising, 
commercial banking, brokerage, and investment banking establishments.  The former is 
presumably largely portfolio management, while the latter is presumably largely financial 
advising to retail customers.  
                                                 
6  As in other industries, an establishment refers to all the activities of a particular firm at a particular 
location.  So, for example, if the small asset management arm of a large commercial bank was housed in its 
own location, it would be classified as a fund management establishment, while if it were housed in that 
bank’s headquarters building, it would usually appear as asset management activities of a commercial 
banking establishment.  In some cases, however, the Census Bureau separates the activities of a common 
owner into multiple establishments even when they are collocated.  The decision to do so appears related to 
the ease with which the activities can be cleanly separated.  “When two or more activities were carried on 
at a single location under a single ownership, all activities generally were grouped together as a single 
establishment. The entire establishment was classified on the basis of its major activity and all data for it 
were included in that classification.  However, when distinct and separate economic activities (for which 
different industry classification codes were appropriate) were conducted at a single location under a single 
ownership, separate establishment reports for each of the different activities were obtained in the census.”  
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2005, A-1). 
      
6 [Insert Table 3 here] 
The $400 billion in total revenue represents about 3.6 percent of GDP and 2 
percent of the stock of financial market assets held by households.
7  As with health care, 
it is impossible to infer over or under spending from the $400 billion number alone, but 
these figures are useful in roughly sizing the economic importance of the sector.  For 
example, suppose that this 3.6 percent of GDP either includes one percent of GDP in pure 
waste or, alternatively, reflects an underinvestment in intermediation services that leads 
to a misallocation of capital that leads to a net waste of one percent of GDP.  Recall from 
the Solow (1956) growth model that the steady state capital-output ratio is equal to s/(d + 
n + g), where s is savings as a percent of GDP, d is the depreciation rate, n is population 
growth, and g is total factor productivity growth.  Taking reasonable values for the last 
three parameters of five, one, and two percent respectively implies that waste or 
misallocation that lowers the savings rate by one percent of GDP reduces the steady state 
capital output ratio by 12.5 percent.  Assuming Cobb-Douglas production with a capital 
share of 0.3, this lowers steady-state output-per-capita by about six percent.
8  This six 
percent reduction, which occurs over time as a lower net savings rate leads to slower 
accumulation of capital, is in addition to the direct waste of the one percent of GDP.
9  In 
                                                 
7    The census year 2002 was a trough year for the securities industry.   Data from the Service Annual 
Survey for 2000-4 reveal that revenue for securities firms with employment (about 90 percent of the total 
by revenue) fell from $385 billion in 2000 to $293 billion in 2002 and then recovered to $349 billion in 
2004.  Product-level data suggests that the declines and recoveries in underwriting, proprietary trading, 
brokerage, and asset management/advice were roughly proportional.  The stock of financial market assets 
held by households is calculated as $19.6 trillion for 2002 by taking total financial assets ($29.7 trillion) 
less bank deposits ($4.0 trillion), equity in non-corporate business ($5.2 trillion), and insurance reserves 
($0.9 trillion).  Source:  Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds Accounts for the United States, Table L100. 
8  If the Cobb-Douglas production function is Y=A*K^a*L^a, then (Y/L) = (Y/K)^[a/(1-a)]*A^[1/(1-a)]. 
9  This Solow model exercise actually understates the importance of an efficient and effective financial 
sector in several ways.  Savings is exogenous in the Solow model; if savers react to financial-sector 
inefficiencies by reducing their saving, the effects could be greater.  In addition, the Solow model assumes 
that capital accumulation and technological progress are independent.  It thus ignores that fact that new 
7 short, the most common argument made in favor of lower taxation of capital, that it leads 
to more capital accumulation and thus higher returns to labor, can also be made in favor 
of an efficient financial sector.
10  The desirability of an efficient financial sector is 
usually uncontroversial, however.  The key question is where are the inefficiencies and 
can better designed regulation address them? 
 
3.  The Economic Rationale for Securities Regulation 
A necessary, but not always sufficient, condition for regulation is to be useful is 
for the unregulated competitive equilibrium to not be socially optimal.  The standard 
conditions for a competitive equilibrium to be optimal are full and symmetric 
information, rational agents, the absence of externalities, and competitive behavior.  Each 
of these conditions is arguably unmet in at least parts of the securities industry, giving 
rise to potential rationales for regulation. 
 
Imperfect information.  Gathering value-relevant information about securities is costly, 
leading even rational investors to choose to be not fully informed in equilibrium 
(Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980).  Delegation to expert agents is often the response, and as 
discussed above, a typical investor invests via multiple layers of agents:  a financial 
advisor to select investment managers, investment managers to select securities and 
exercise any voting rights, brokers to trade those securities, and managers of the 
securities’ issuers to produce returns. 
                                                                                                                                                 
firms and new vintages of capital equipment are a primary means through which new technologies are 
developed and deployed, respectively.   
10  For an example of the former, see Council of Economic Advisers (2003), Chapter 5. 
8 As alignment of incentives in these agency relationships is often imperfect, 
delegation and imperfect information can give rise to moral hazard problems.  Financial 
advisors may prioritize recommending the investment products of their employer 
(Christofferson, Evans, and Musto, 2005).
11  They may also make recommendations 
based on sales commissions or other considerations provided by the fund family.
12  
Managers of investment products may engage in activities that lower the returns of their 
portfolios but benefit them privately, such as tolerating arbitrage trading in exchange for 
investments in other high-fee funds (Zitzewitz, 2003).  They may also reallocate returns 
into portfolios with higher incentive-based compensation (Cici, Gibson, and Moussawi, 
2006) or more return-sensitive investors (Gaspar, Massa, and Matos, 2005) through a 
variety of techniques.  Brokers may place trades in a manner that reduces clients’ 
execution quality but provides them with a private benefit.
13  And, of course, issuing 
firms’ managers may manage in a way that places their own interests ahead of their 
shareholders.      
  Regulation can seek to limit agency problems in several ways.  Merit regulation 
proscribes certain practices, investment products, or fee levels.  Examples include laws 
                                                 
11  This prioritization is sometimes less straightforward to detect that one might assume, given the practice 
of using investment product brands that differ from the brand under which the adviser conducts business 
but are nonetheless owned by the same firm (e.g., an advisor in a First Union bank branch selling an 
Evergreen mutual fund).   
12  Generally, doing so is legal so long as the payments are disclosed.  Recent regulatory cases illustrate the 
boundaries of what is permitted.  Some advisors sold higher commission “B share” versions of a mutual 
fund to investors without disclosing that lower commission “A share” versions were available (e.g., SEC 
administrative case 3-11179 against IFG Network Securities).  Others sold funds from an approved list that 
mutual funds made undisclosed payments to be included on (e.g., SEC administrative case 3-11780 against 
Edward Jones).  Others recommended funds in exchange for the funds’ having directed brokerage business 
to the advisor’s firm (e.g., SEC administrative case 3-11868 against Putnam Investment Management, 
LLC). 
13  Examples include internally matching client orders with proprietary or favored-client trades at 
disadvantageous prices, bundling orders with informed order flow from hedge fund clients or proprietary 
traders, routing orders to lower volume exchanges in exchange for payments for order flow, and illegally 
front running clients’ transactions. 
9 prohibiting front running (trading in advance of one’s clients to profit from the impact 
their trades have on prices) or Ponzi schemes.  Anti-fraud regulation can help make 
voluntary disclosure about agents’ performance and practices credible by prosecuting 
agents who lie.  Mandatory disclosure regulation can both require disclosure of 
performance and practices and impose standards to make such disclosures more 
comparable.          
Imperfect information can also give rise to adverse selection problems.  In the 
absence of regulation, agents who engage in behavior that benefits themselves at the 
expense of their clients may be more profitable and if so will have more incentive to 
market their products aggressively.  This can create a lemons problem (Akerlof, 1971) in 
which bad agents and products drive out good ones.  Regulation can potentially help, 
again by either mandating disclosure or prohibiting practices. 
 
Investor behavior.  The question of whether efforts to protect consumers should focus 
on disclosure requirements or on merit regulation that restricts products and behavior is a 
central debate in financial regulation.  As discussed below, the SEC generally favors the 
former, while the state regulators who enforce anti-fraud statues tend to take the latter 
approach.  As Zingales (2004) emphasizes, an advantage of disclosure regulation is that 
its costs are usually smaller than those of merit regulation, which risks limiting 
innovation. 
A problem though is that for the unsophisticated investors most in need of 
protection, the benefits of additional disclosure may be small too.  Whether regulation 
requiring disclosure is effective depends on whether investors can make use of the 
10 information.  When buying securities or investments, many consumers are unaware of the 
most basic information that is disclosed.  In addition, they exhibit behavioral biases, 
particularly naïveté about the incentives of experts. 
For many financial products, the majority of customers do not understand the 
rather central concept of a “price.”  For example, in a 2002 survey by Vanguard and 
Money magazine, only 25 percent of investors correctly identified the expense ratio as 
the annual fee they pay for a mutual fund (on a multiple choice question with no guessing 
penalty).  Likewise, an OCC/SEC survey reported on by Alexander, Jones, and Nigro 
(2001, p. 164) found that only 19 percent of mutual fund investors reported knowing the 
(approximate) expense ratio of their largest fund investment.
14  Hortascu and Syverson 
(2004) find that a large proportion of investors choose S&P index funds as if they had 
very high search costs.  An alternative interpretation of their results would be that 
investors observe price imperfectly when choosing their funds (Busse, Elton, and Gruber, 
2004), or misunderstand the strong negative relationship between fees and after-fee 
performance (Carhart, 1997 and others).
15  Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2004) find that 
investors react more to fees that are salient, such as front-end sales commissions that are 
deducted from their investment at time of purchase, than to fees that are less salient, such 
as expenses or deferred commissions that are deducted over time.  Choi, Laibson, and 
                                                 
14  In contrast, a recent Investment Company Institute (2006) survey found that 74 percent of investors 
claimed to have reviewed the expense ratio before making their most recent mutual fund investment.   
Possible reconciliations of these results include:  1) investors may have become more sensitive to fees since 
2002, 2) the ICI sample was more sophisticated than the Vanguard-Money or OCC-SEC samples, or 3) the 
ICI survey asked whether investors had review the fund’s fees, but did not test this knowledge. 
15  Mutual funds are unlike many other products in that quality (at least as measured by after-expense 
returns) is close to uncorrelated with past quality, but quality is strongly negatively related to price.  Studies 
of investor demand for funds (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997, and others) suggest that many investors appear 
to invest as if they expect quality (returns) to be positively serially correlated and to get more when they 
pay more, as one might expect if these investors were applying their experience from other products to 
mutual funds. 
11 Madrian (2006) find that undergraduate and MBA students at top schools fail to choose 
the lowest expense ratio index fund even when furnished with information on fees, in part 
because of a belief that past returns are informative about future returns. 
 One might think that investors do not need to understand expense ratios, since 
expense ratios are deducted from net returns, and investors should care primarily about 
net returns.  The problem with this logic is that past net returns are almost uncorrelated 
with future net returns, and a low expense ratio is by the far the best single predictor of 
high future returns. Mutual funds are unlike many other products in that future “quality” 
(at least as measured by before-expense returns) is close to uncorrelated with past quality, 
but quality is negatively related to price.  Studies of investor demand for funds (Chevalier 
and Ellison, 1997, and others) suggest that many investors appear to invest as if they 
expect quality (returns) to be positively serially correlated and to get more when they pay 
more, as one might expect if these investors were applying their experience from other 
products to mutual funds (Mullainathan, Schwartzstein and Shleifer, 2007).  
A similar percentage in the Vanguard-Money survey misunderstood loads (sales 
commissions paid to the broker who sells a fund).  Along with the salience issue 
discussed by Barber, Odean, and Zheng, this might help explain the recent popularity of 
“B” shares, in which the broker’s commission is deducted gradually from shareholder’s 
assets as opposed to being deducted from their investment upfront.  As mentioned above, 
it is alleged that brokers misrepresent “B” shares as being no-load funds or steer investors 
into “B” shares where there are lower commission alternatives. 
Among investment products, however, mutual fund fees are perhaps the most 
transparent.  Variable annuities carry a variety of fees that are in many cases collectively 
12 large enough to pay sales commissions of 10 percent of the amount invested.  In July 
2004, the New York Times reported on the sales of a set of extremely disadvantageous 
contractual mutual fund and life insurance products on military bases (Henriques, 2004).  
In both types of products, the fees that finance sales commissions are not deducted from 
an investor’s investment upfront in a transparent manner, but instead are spread across 
various administration fees, expenses charged to the underlying investments, and fees for 
death benefits that are well above the cost of a comparable amount of term life insurance. 
In brokerage accounts, many investors understand commissions, are less likely to 
understand other trading costs such as the bid-ask spread and how it is affected by order 
handling rules.  When investors buy bonds from a brokerage at no commission, many do 
not realize that the brokerage is charging a markup that usually exceeds the commission 
on comparably-sized stock transactions (see e.g., Harris and Piwowar, 2004).  Likewise, 
when investors buy shares in public offerings, some are unaware that the company is 
paying an underwriting commission on the proceeds, creating a wedge between the 
amount they pay and the funds that management is able to invest on their behalf.  Some 
have argued (e.g., Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler, 1991) that the fact that investors buy closed-
end fund IPOs at a premium to net asset value despite the fact that these funds typically 
trade at a discount several months later provides an example of investors 
misunderstanding these issues. 
Apart from difficulty understanding prices, the field of behavioral finance has 
documented a variety of psychological biases that affect consumers when making 
financial decisions.
16  Investors, especially males, trade too frequently (Shefrin and 
                                                 
16  A full review of the field is well beyond the scope of this chapter – Shefrin (2002), Barberis and Thaler 
(2003), and Shiller (2003) provide excellent summaries.  The findings of behavioral finance about 
13 Statman, 1994; Odean, 1998).  Investors also react to news inefficiently.  At short-to-
medium time horizons (e.g., one year) investors suffer from the disposition effect, 
holding on to losing investments too long and selling winners too quickly (Shefrin and 
Statman, 1985).  This is the reverse of what would be optimal given the tax treatment of 
capital gains and the longstanding findings of momentum in stock prices at the one-year 
time horizon (Jagadesh and Titman, 1993).  Investors also display the disposition effect 
in their mutual fund investments, holding on to underperforming mutual funds despite the 
fact that these funds tend to repeat their underperformance (Carhart 1997; Kacperczyk, 
Sialm, and Zheng, 2006).  A psychological reason for avoiding selling a losing 
investment is that it creates cognitive dissonance – booking a loss is an acknowledgement 
that the initial investment was a mistake.
17  Firing a financial advisor that one once 
trusted requires a similar acknowledgement and creates a stickiness that some advisors 
may exploit.   
Many investors also appear to be excessively influenced by and naïve about the 
incentives of financial advisors, equity analysts, and the financial media.  Across a 
variety of metrics, financial advisors choose funds for their clients that are no better than 
the funds no-load investors choose for themselves (Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano, 
2005), and advisors are particularly unlikely to advise a client to sell a persistently 
underperforming fund offered by their employer (Christofferson, Evans, and Musto, 
2005).  Alexander, Jones, and Nigro (2001) report that many investors have 
                                                                                                                                                 
consumer behavior in this industry has motivated some to consider the implications of boundedly-rational 
consumer behavior in other industries, see, e.g. Gabaix and Laibson (2005). 
17  Investors overreact to positive news at longer time horizons (e.g., 3-5 years), buying stocks that have 
performed well in the last 3-5 years and pushing up their prices to the point where they underperform in the 
future (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985 and 1989).  This can also be rationalized as being due to cognitive 
dissonance if investors window dress their own portfolios, removing long-term losing stocks and buying 
stocks they wish they had bought earlier.  
14 misconceptions about the sign of the correlation between expenses and future returns, the 
degree of persistence in mutual fund returns, and whether money market funds are FDIC 
insured, and that in some cases they acquire this misconceptions from their financial 
advisors.
18  One of the strongest predictors of mutual fund inflows is high 12b1 fees; 
12b1 fees are collected from investors and mostly used to finance payments to the 
brokerage or advisor that recommended the fund (Reid and Rea, 2003).
19  Mutual fund 
recommendations in personal finance magazines are associated with significant future 
inflows, despite the fact that positively mentioned funds perform no better than average 
in the future and that mentions are correlated with a fund family’s past advertising 
(Reuter and Zitzewitz, 2006).  Investors in stocks react to media reports, even when they 
contain no new information.  One of the most famous examples is the four-fold increase 
in the stock price of EntreMed that followed a front-page New York Times story, despite 
the fact that the potential breakthrough in cancer research highlighted in the article had 
been published in Nature and written up in other newspapers (including the Times) over 
the prior five months (Huberman and Regev, 2001).  CEO interviews on CNBC from 
1999-2001 were accompanied by a 1.65 percent stock price appreciation that mean-
reverted over the next day (Mischke, 2004; see also Busse and Clifton, 2001).  The 
                                                 
18  For example, 35 percent of investors in money market mutual funds who used a broker believe that they 
are these funds are insured, and 23 percent of those report being told this by their broker (p. 180).  The 
number of investors who believe in a positive relationship between expenses and returns outnumbers those 
who believe in a negative relationship (19.9 percent to 15.7 percent); the margin widens to 21.0 to 14.0 for 
investors who invest only through intermediaries (banks, brokers, insurance companies, or retirement 
plans) (p. 165).  Twenty-four percent of investors expect a fund with a good performance in the previous 
year to have above average performance in the next year (p. 166). 
19  A 12b1 fee refers to a fee that a fund can charge its shareholders to pay for the marketing and 
distribution of fund, authorized under rule 12b1 promulgated by the SEC under the Investment Company 
Act of 1940.  The fund’s trustees must conclude that doing so is in the interests of shareholders, for 
example, by generating enough asset growth to allow a management fee reduction that more than offsets 
the fee.  While there is strong evidence that 12b1 fees are correlated with inflows, some have questioned 
whether this growth leads to reduction in management fees sufficient to provide a net benefit to 
shareholders (e.g., Walsh, 2004).  As a result, more recent justifications of 12b1 fees have argued that they 
benefit shareholders because they are used to pay brokers for services provided to shareholders.      
15 discounts of foreign closed-end funds (the difference between the price of a fund and the 
value of its underlying assets) react to whether and how extensively foreign news is 
reported in the U.S. press (Klibanoff, Lamont, and Wizman, 1998).  Media-savvy issuers 
appear to exploit these biases, by directing media attention to the most favorable earnings 
metric (Dyck and Zingales, 2005) and by announcing bad news on Friday afternoons 
(Bagnoli, Clement, and Watts, 2005; Della Vigna and Polley, 2005).  Investors’ reliance 
on the media has also been exploited through include trading in advance of media 
coverage and the use of the media to manipulate asset prices.
20     
There are limits to the extent to which regulation can protect investors from their 
own biases or a lack of sophistication.  As with regulation designed to address 
information problems, regulatory responses to investor behavior have generally taken two 
different approaches.  First, merit and anti-fraud regulations protect the least 
sophisticated investors by restricting the availability of certain types of securities or 
financial services that are viewed as particularly abusive (e.g., Ponzi schemes) and 
limiting others to sophisticated investors (e.g., hedge funds).  Both the SEC and self-
regulatory bodies such as the NASD regulate the behavior of investment professionals 
such as stock brokers and investment advisors, particularly the exploitation of investors’ 
naïveté and biases.  Second, regulations force the disclosure of certain characteristics of 
issuers and investments to ensure that sophisticated investors have access to a certain 
                                                 
20  Examples include the insiders who provided tips on the content of the Wall Street Journal’s “Heard on 
the Street” and Business Week’s “Inside Wall Street” columns and financial columnists who have allegedly 
recommended stocks they hold positions in. 
16 minimum level of information and in some cases mandate certain standardized formats to 
increase the salience of the information to investors.
21
 
Externalities.  Two example of externalities that potentially provide a rationale for 
regulation are free-riding in monitoring and so called preference externalities.  
Monitoring corporate or investment managers generates benefits that are shared by other 
investors.  It therefore suffers from a potential free rider problem.  This free rider 
problem is partially addressed through three mechanisms.  First, the pricing of securities 
or investments in the secondary market can create an incentive for a shareholder to 
acquire a large stake and then monitor management, internalizing the benefits of their 
monitoring in proportion to their stake.  As an example, investor have recently purchased 
stakes in underperforming closed-end mutual funds at a discount and then forced 
management to redeem the all or some of their shares at net asset value.  Some of the 
benefits of this form of monitoring spill over to the other shareholders of the fund, 
suggesting that it will be underprovided by the market. 
  Second, shareholders exert monitoring through boards of directors.  Corporate 
security issuers have boards of directors that monitor management.  Investments such as 
mutual funds are formally organized as companies, and are required to have a board of 
directors whose responsibilities include hiring, monitoring, and negotiating fees with the 
investment manager.  The desired level of independence of both corporate and 
investment company board members is a matter of active debate.  Tufano and Sevick 
                                                 
21  For example, the SEC requires that mutual fund prospectuses contain at their beginning a “Risk-Return 
Summary” that includes information on fees and past performance.  It also regulates the reporting of past 
performance to limit the extent to which fund companies can distort their track records by manipulating the 
time period reported.  
17 (1997), Del Guercio, Dann, and Partch (2003), and Zitzewitz (2003) provide evidence 
that investment company board independence is correlated with shareholder-friendly fee 
and valuation policies.  The SEC recently issued a rule requiring that 75 percent of 
investment company board members and the board chair be independent of employment 
or other business relationships with the investment manager, although this rule has been 
challenged in court.  On the other hand, some question whether boards are necessary for 
investments (Tkac, 2004), invoking the fact that investment companies in other countries 
do not have boards (Damato, Reilly, and Richardson, 2004).  Khorana, Servaes, and 
Tufano (2005 and 2007) compare mutual fund industries across countries, finding that the 
industry is larger and fees are lower in countries with stronger investor protections, 
including boards of directors. 
  Third, the media and other third-party experts can potentially play a monitoring 
role.  Media publications motivated by subscription revenue or analysts interested in 
building followership in the markets have an incentive to provide high-quality 
information to their clients.  At the same time, these experts may have other, conflicting 
motivations.  As mentioned above, Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) find a correlation 
between the mutual fund recommendations of personal finance magazines and past 
advertising.
22  They also find that the publications overweight past returns and 
underweight fees when determining which fund to recommend, which might be regarded 
as a form of pro-industry bias.
23  Lin and McNichols (1998) and  Michaely and Womack 
                                                 
22  In contrast, Miller (2006) finds that the media’s coverage of accounting fraud in an industry is not 
related to the industry’s propensity to advertise. 
23  Arguably another potential example of pro-industry bias in the financial media is that fact that academic 
studies documenting the extent of stale price arbitrage in mutual funds (e.g., Goetzmann, Ivkovic, and 
Rouwenhorst, 2001; Greene and Hodges, 2002; Zitzewitz, 2003) were known to reporters at major 
publications, and yet they were discussed extremely rarely until the announcement of New York Attorney 
General (NYAG) Eliot Spitzer’s investigation in September 2003. Two notable exceptions were Stone 
18 (1999) find a correlation between analysts’ security recommendations and their 
employer’s underwriting business, and this relationship has been extensively probed by 
regulators in recent years.    
  Investor’s preferences can also impose externalities on other investors.  George 
and Waldfogel (2003) argue that when newspaper readers are homogeneous they create 
positive externalities for one another by enlarging the market and generating scale 
economies.  When they are heterogeneous, however, they can generate negative 
externalities.  George and Waldfogel (2006) provide an example, arguing that the New 
York Times’ entering a newspaper market “spreads ignorance and apathy” by attracting 
educated readers away from the local paper, making it optimal for the local paper to 
reduce national coverage and appeal to less educated readers.  Both externalities are 
present in securities and investment markets.  In investments, Vanguard arguably plays 
the role of the New York Times, attracting expense-ratio-sensitive investors and lowering 
the average fee sensitivity of other firms’ clients. 
Regulation can and does address these externalities in several ways.  On some 
issues regulators play the role of monitor themselves, by enforcing rules against certain 
behavior.  By mandating boards and regulating the independence and election of their 
members, regulators can make the collective action problem cheaper for investors to 
solve.  By mandating disclosure, regulators can facilitate the monitoring roles of both 
boards and outsiders such as analysts and the media.  Regulators can also address 
externalities arising from the bifurcation of markets into products targeting sophisticated 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2002) and Carnahan (2003), although it should be noted that even these articles appeared only in the 
online editions of Business Week and Forbes, respectively.  Other articles discussed the issue, but framed it 
in a way that buried the lead (e.g., “Monitoring Trades for the Good of the Fund”, New York Times, 
4/9/2000).  After the announcement of the NYAG’s investigation, the financial media did report on the 
issues thoroughly. 
19 and unsophisticated investors, either by aiding investors who seek to become 
sophisticated or by limiting the exploitation of the unsophisticated.   
 
Competitive behavior.   Most financial industries have free entry and large numbers of 
competitors, and so there is a temptation to assume that they are close to perfectly 
competitive.  At the same time, some of the institutional features that industrial 
economists normally associate with soft competition are present in these industries.  
Especially following the relaxation and ultimately the repeal of the separations between 
commercial banking, insurance, and securities in the Glass-Steagel Act, many financial 
services firms compete against each other in multiple markets, which can facilitate soft 
competition (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990).  In addition, agency relationships (e.g., 
steering financial advisory clients toward or away from a competitor’s offerings) may 
provide an inexpensive means of rewarding or punishing a firm for behavior in another 
market.  In many settings, prices or fees are readily observable to one’s competitors, 
making secret discounting more difficult to implement.  For example, underwriting fees 
are disclosed in offering documents, investment fees are disclosed in prospectuses, and 
spreads charged market makers are readily observable by other market makers.  One 
should not necessarily expect free entry to lead to tough competition; as Hsieh and 
Morreti (2003) illustrate in their study of residential real estate brokerage, free entry can 
be consistent with established firms earning economic rents, although some of the rents 
may be wastefully dissipated through non-price competition and business stealing effects.  
 
20 A market failure is a necessary condition for regulation to be optimal, but it is not 
always sufficient.  Market imperfections must be weighed against the imperfections of 
the legislative and regulatory institutions responsible for rule making and enforcement.  
This motivates turning to a discussion of the main laws and institutions of U.S. financial 
regulation.      
 
4.  The main laws and institutions 
The core of modern federal financial regulation is formed by four laws passed 
during the Great Depression:  the Securities Act of 1933 (the “1933 Act”), the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”), the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the 
“1940 Act”), and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.
24  These four acts each regulate a 
stage in the value chain discussed above:  respectively, they regulate the issuance of 
securities,
25 the brokerage and secondary trading of securities and the ongoing disclosure 
requirements of their issuers, investment companies (open and closed-end mutual funds), 
and investment advisors (including both advisors who manage client assets directly as 
well as those who manage the assets of investment companies). 
The 1933 Act requires the registration of securities with the SEC (subject to 
certain exemptions, e.g., for private placements that are not made available to the public) 
and requires the delivery of a prospectus to investors.  Given that investors have a 
favorable cause of action if the issuer makes materially misleading statements or 
omissions in its offering documents, the disclosure in offering documents is generally 
much more extensive than ongoing disclosure by issuers.  This generates two substantial 
                                                 
24   This brief overview of securities regulation draws heavily on Coffee and Seligman (2002), who I refer 
readers to for more detail. 
25  Along with the 1933 Act, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 also governs the issuance of bonds. 
21 costs to an initial offering of securities, 1) the fees and other costs associated with 
generating and delivering these documents and 2) the competitive costs of the extensive 
disclosure of business information that is usually involved. 
The 1934 Act establishes annual and quarterly disclosure requirements for 
companies, requires SEC preclearance of proxy statements for shareholder votes, and 
establishes a self-regulatory system for stock exchanges and brokers.  The stock 
exchanges and the NASD, which self-regulates stock brokers, are both overseen by the 
SEC.  The 1934 Act (also referred to as the “Exchange Act”) gives the SEC broad rule 
making authority to proscribe practices of broker-dealers as “manipulative, deceptive, or 
otherwise fraudulent.”  The 1934 Act has been amended by Congress multiple times, 
examples include the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments (which extended disclosure 
requirements to large over-the-counter [i.e., public, but not stock-exchange-listed] firms), 
the 1970 amendment creating the Securities Investor Protection Corporate (which 
provides FDIC-like insurance for brokerage accounts), the Securities Act Amendments of 
1975 (which deregulated brokerage commissions), the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
1977 (prohibiting bribery by public companies), the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 
1984 and Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (which sought to limit certain types of 
shareholder class action lawsuits), and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been both controversial and an active current 
research topic and thus merits additional discussion.  Most provisions of SOX appear to 
be a direct response to specific accounting abuses at firms such as Enron and Worldcom.   
SOX creates a self-regulatory body to regulate the accounting profession, restricts the 
22 provision of consulting and other services by an audit firm to an audit client, and requires 
the rotation of the lead audit partner every 5 years.  For issuers, SOX requires audit 
committees to be composed entirely of independent directors and requires CEOs and 
CFOs to certify the firm’s accounting numbers and face disgorgement of compensation 
and stock trading profits and criminal sanctions for misleading earnings or knowingly 
false statements.  SOX requires the SEC to develop rules requiring companies report on 
the adequacy of internal controls, rules requiring attorneys appearing before the SEC to 
report security laws violations, and rules governing the independence of security analysts.  
It also tightens rules on stock trading by directors and executives, extends the statue of 
limitations for securities fraud, and enhances protections for corporate whistleblowers. 
SOX has been heavily criticized by the business community and some scholars 
for making external and internal auditing more expensive and onerous.
26  Eldridge and 
Kealey (2005) report that average audit fees for a sample of 648 Fortune 1000 companies 
increased from $3.5 million to $5.8 million from 2003 to 2004, and they attribute most of 
this increase to SOX.  Leuz, Triantis, Wang (2004) and Carney (2005) argue that costs 
associated with SOX may have encouraged some firms to delist.  Against this cost is the 
benefit firms with clean accounting received from a restored investor confidence.  Li, 
Pincus, and Rego (2008) and Rezaee and Jain (2006) found positive stock price responses 
to the act.  Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2007) find more positive event returns for larger 
firms, as one might expect given that the costs of SOX increase more slowly with firm 
                                                 
26  For example, Romano (2005) claims it ignored the findings of the empirical and accounting literature, 
attributes its passage to a media frenzy and the impending midterm elections, and calls it “Quack Corporate 
Governance.”   
23 size than the benefits.
27  This early evidence suggests that, for better or worse, SOX has 
significantly “raised the bar” for being a public company. 
The 1940 Act regulates open and closed-end mutual funds.  Mutual funds are far 
more important than when the 1940 Act was passed:  in 2003 equity mutual funds 
accounted for 19.7 percent of household equity holdings and money market funds 
accounted for 21.2 percent of household holdings of cash equivalents (demand deposits, 
time deposits, etc.).
28    The 1940 Act contains provisions designed to protect 
shareholders from dilution by fund managers.  It requires that investment companies have 
a board of trustees, that they annually review the management contract for the fund, and 
that a majority of these trustees be independent of the investment advisor.  It establishes 
the fiduciary duties of the trustees and the investment advisor.  It also establishes rules 
governing transactions in shares of open-end mutual funds designed to ensure that 
investors transact at prices that reflect fair market values. 
Although the 1940 Act does include some regulation of behavior, like the 1933 
Act and 1934 Act, it relies primarily on disclosure.  As Jackson (1997, p. 535) puts it:  
“the 1940 Act relies on disclosure-based regulation more than any other comparable 
regulatory structure in the United States.”  This is notable in that whereas the 1933 and 
1934 Act regulate securities markets where arbitrage ensures that sophisticated investors 
will have significant influence on asset prices, the 1940 Act regulates investments that are 
                                                 
27  Bushee and Leuz (2005) and Greenstone, Oyer, and Vissing-Jorgenson (2006) find analogous results for 
the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments, which extended disclosure requirements to firms traded on the OTC 
Bulletin Board:  the disclosure requirements led some firms to delist (Bushee and Leuz) but was 
accompanied by positive event returns for those that remained (Greenstone, et. al.).   
28  The money market mutual fund share of cash equivalents is calculated from lines 2-5 of Table L.100 of 
the Flow of Funds Data for 2002.  Mutual fund share of equity holdings is U.S. mutual fund holdings of 
domestic stock estimated from the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free Mutual Funds Database of $2.2 trillion 
divided by the sum of market capitalizations of equities listed in the CRSP Stock Price database of $11.3 
trillion.  Both of the later figures are year-end 2002.  
24 designed primarily for unsophisticated investors.  Mutual funds cannot be sold short, and 
so market efficiency requires that full information and rationality be possessed by all 
investors, not merely a relatively small number with access to sufficient arbitrage capital. 
Finally, the Investment Advisors Act requires registration of investment advisors 
managing a substantial amount of client assets (currently, $30 million) in either 
investment companies or separate accounts.  It also prohibits fraud and certain deceptive 
practices and limits the circumstances under which the advisor can receive incentive 
compensation.  Until recently, SEC rules exempted advisors with a limited number of 
“accredited” (i.e., wealthy enough to be assumed to be sophisticated) clients from 
registration.  The SEC recently attempted to tighten these rules in a way that would force 
most hedge fund advisors to register under the Act, but their action was overturned in 
Goldstein vs. SEC (2006).      
The SEC has the primary responsibility for enforcing and promulgating new rules 
under these acts.
29  It is organized around these acts, with the Division of Corporate 
Finance having primary responsibility for the 1933 Act, the Division of Market 
Regulation for the 1934 Act, and the Division of Investment Management for the 1940 
Act and Investment Advisors Act.  These divisions support the Commission in its two 
major channels for policy making:  the promulgation of new rules under the Acts and 
responding to parties requesting that the Commission take “no action” against a novel 
practice.   Enforcement is handled by its own division, and these four divisions are 
                                                 
29  The SEC was also charged with enforcing the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, which 
restricted interstate and non-regulated holdings of regulated utility companies, before its repeal by the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005.  Even before then, Coffee and Seligman (2002, p. 70) had noted that this is “no 
longer an important statue because the SEC has largely deregulated the field” through rule making and 
enforcement policy. 
25 supported by functional offices (the Office of General Counsel, Office of Chief 
Accountant, and Office of Economic Analysis). 
The SEC has grown considerably in the last 3 years in terms of both staff and 
budget (Figure 3).  It has also engaged in a significant amount of new rulemaking.  A 
number of the more important new rules have involved increased disclosure by 
investment companies and advisors.
30  In some cases, enhanced disclosure requirements 
were adopted as a compromise in lieu of either direct dictation of practices (e.g., on fair 
value pricing) or more meaningful disclosure (e.g., of portfolio manager salaries, as 
opposed to the factors used to determine them).  In addition, certain practices that were 
viewed as harmful to shareholders have been prohibited
31 and fiduciary duties have been 
clarified.
32   The SEC has promulgated rules as needed to implement SOX.  It has also 
used rule making to implement decimalization, to relax short-selling rules (Regulation 
SHO), and to limit selective disclosure by companies, particularly to equity analysts 
(Regulation FD). 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
As mentioned above, the 1934 Act provides for the SEC to delegate primary 
regulatory authority to self-regulatory organizations (SROs):  the stock exchanges self-
                                                 
30  For example, investment advisors are now required to disclose how they voted shareholder proxies (SEC 
Rule IA-2106).  Investment companies are required to disclose their after-tax returns (33-8010) and to 
provide information about portfolio managers, including the factors used to determine their compensation 
(33-8458), about how the trustees determined the appropriateness of management fees (33-8433), about the 
availability of front-load commission discounts (33-8427), and about their policies regarding market 
timing, fair value pricing, and selective disclosure of portfolio holdings (33-8408).  
31  For example, investment companies are now prohibited from directing brokerage commissions to firms 
as a reward for selling fund shares (SEC Rule IC-26591), as this was viewed as fund advisors using 
shareholders’ assets to reward brokers for an activity that primarily benefits the advisor. 
32  For example, SEC Rule IA-2106 requires that investment companies vote shareholder proxies in their 
own shareholders’ interest.  Although fund trustees already had a fiduciary responsibility to ensure that 
advisory and other fees charged to a fund were appropriate and SEC Rule 33-8433 formally only requires 
additional disclosure of the basis of that decision, some have argued that in practice it is likely to reinforce 
trustees’ fiduciary responsibilities in this area.  
26 regulate themselves, the NASD regulates its broker-dealer members, and the new 
Accounting Oversight Board created by SOX regulates the accounting profession.  In 
each case, the SEC holds ultimate regulatory authority.  A similar structure exists for 
derivatives, where the CFTC acts as the ultimate regulator, but delegates self regulatory 
authority to exchanges such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME).  Generally, 
cooperation in this system is amicable, but there are exceptions, with the forced 
replacement of the NASD leadership following the Nasdaq market maker collusion 
scandal being a prime example.   
Before modern federal securities regulation began in the 1930s, most states had 
their own regulations.  These are often called “blue sky” laws, and they typically focus on 
the prevention of fraud by brokers, investment advisors, and securities issuers.  They 
require registration by brokers and advisors and of newly offered securities, and the 
resulting registration fees provide a source of revenue that no states choose to forego.  
Apart from their revenue collection role, state securities laws declined in importance in 
the 1980s and 1990s, when a number of states dropped merit regulation of securities 
offerings, and the National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996 preempted state 
registration requirements for exchanged listed securities.  This trend has reversed in the 
last five years, particularly as former NYAG Eliot Spitzer has used the broad authority 
given him in New York State’s Martin Act of 1921 to pursue allegedly fraudulent activity 
by equity analysts, mutual funds, and insurance companies. 
The NYAG’s activity in the last four years has created competition between state 
and federal regulators.
33  Whereas some states (e.g., Michigan) have explicitly rejected 
                                                 
33  Romano (2001) discusses the potential benefits of competition across regulatory venues that issuers and 
investors could select (e.g., stock exchanges of different countries).  The current competition between the 
27 the suggestion that they investigate securities issues in parallel with the SEC, many others 
(e.g., California, Colorado, Kansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, West Virgina, and Wisconsin) have investigated in parallel or in advance of the 
SEC.  Some have criticized the activities of New York and the other states, and indeed 
the Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2003 included language 
that would have preempted the Martin Act, had it passed (Macey, 2005).  At the same 
time, Eliot Spitzer and other state regulators have explicitly cited regulatory capture at the 
SEC in motivating action by the states.
34
This revives a longstanding critique of the SEC and the SROs as reflecting the 
interests of industry, particularly in more aggressive enforcement action against 
misconduct by rouge individuals (broker fraud, insider trading) than against more 
systemic forms of misconduct (analyst conflicts, mutual fund compliance issues, earnings 
management).  Those concerned about regulatory capture worry about two sources:  top-
down and bottom-up.  A potential source of top-down is the natural political influence of 
so large an industry.
35  The partisan divide of the SEC over several recent regulators 
proposals has also revived interest in the partisan political economy of the SEC (e.g., 
Zitzewitz, 2002).  A source of bottom-up capture is the staffing approach of SROs and 
the SEC.  Turnover rates for attorneys, accountants, and compliance examiners at the 
SEC are more than twice those for comparable-level employees elsewhere in the federal 
government, including in bank regulation (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2002).  
                                                                                                                                                 
state and federal governments is subtly different in that it involves competition between institutions to 
regulate the same venue. 
34  See interviews of Eliot Spitzer cited by Abrams and Cohen (2004) and O’Brien (2005). 
35  Opensecrets.org lists the securities industry as the fourth largest political donor; it probably also 
accounts for some portion of the donations of the top industry, the legal profession.  The securities 
industry’s influence is not monolithic, and on many issues different parts of the industry have different 
interests (see, e.g., the analysis of interest group competition in Kroszner and Stratman, 1998).  
28 As Woodward (2001, p. 100) argues, the “best, and best by a wide margin, post-SEC 
employment opportunities [are] working for the regulatees ….”
36 A “revolving door” 
staffing model where employees work short tenures in the government and then transition 
to higher-salaried positions in industry can be successful in attracting talented individuals 
at a reasonable cost, but has been long regarded as a source of regulatory capture (Stigler, 
1971).   
 Following the above review of the scope of the securities industry, the economic 
rationale for regulation, and the main laws and institutions, I now turn to three recent 
issues in the regulation of financial services and markets that have parallels in other 
industries. 
 
5.  The Regulation of Pricing 
In November 2003 in testimony before multiple Congressional committees, Eliot Spitzer 
called attention to the “$70 billion in management and advisory fees” paid by mutual 
fund investors in 2002 that “are in addition to significant costs – such as trading costs – 
that are passed on to investors.”
37  Spitzer cited the difference between advisory fees 
charged by the same firm to retail and institutional accounts reported by Freeman and 
Brown (2001), and he cited weak fund governance as the root cause of both the mutual 
fund share trading scandal and what he regards as excessive level of fees:  “We know that 
directors and managers breached their duties to investors in every conceivable manner. 
                                                 
36  A recent Government Accountability Office report (GAO-05-385, “Mutual Fund Trading Abuses: SEC 
Consistently Applied Procedures in Setting Penalties, but Could Strengthen Certain Internal Controls”) 
found that the SEC did not have a system in place for ensuring that departing staff’s next employer did not 
present a conflict of interest. 
37  “Testimony of State of New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer Before the United States Senate 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee,” November 20, 2003, p. 2. 
29 As regulators and lawmakers, our duty to investors is to investigate every manifestation 
of that breach and to return to investors any and all fees that were improper or 
inappropriate.  This includes the fees that the managers received during the very time that 
they were violating their fiduciary duties to investors.”
38  Spitzer proposed disclosure of 
the precise dollar amount of fees paid to each investor, a strengthening of fund trustee’s 
fiduciary duties with respect to fees, most favored nations clauses preventing retail 
mutual funds from being charge more than institutional accounts, and competitive 
bidding for advisory contracts.  Lacking the jurisdiction to act on any of these proposals, 
Spitzer negotiated fee reductions with several mutual fund companies as part of 
subsequent settlements of share trading allegations. 
The mutual fund industry and the SEC were not especially receptive to this line of 
argument.  The SEC did not participate in the fee reduction portion of the mutual fund 
settlements, even when all other aspects of the settlement negotiations were coordinated.  
Regarding retail-institutional fee differences, the industry argued (convincingly) that 
servicing retail clients was more expensive per dollar invested than servicing institutional 
clients and (perhaps less convincingly) that this accounted for entire difference in fees 
charged.  Requiring the disclosure of fees paid by individuals was included at one point 
in a House of Representatives bill, but removed in committee.  The SEC did require 
disclosure of trustees’ rationale for the advisory fees charged, and some expect this to 
increase pressure from boards for fee reductions. 
Any evidence of pressure created by this disclosure for lower fund expenses has 
yet to emerge from the data.  On a “same store” basis, the average expense ratio for funds 
                                                 
38  Ibid, p. 3. 
30 declined less than one percent from 2002 to 2004.
39  In addition, the debate over 
expenses does not appear to created market pressure for fee reductions.  Although the 
combined market shares of Vanguard, Fidelity, and American Funds, three large fund 
families with lower than average expense ratios, increased from 27.6 to 33.5 percent from 
2002 to 2004, this was more than offset by an increase in the average expense ratio 
charged by other funds in the industry, and the asset-weighted average expense ratio 
actually increased slightly from 2002-4 (Table 4).  As discussed above, even if some 
investors became more sensitive to fees during this period and switched assets to lower-
expense-ratio firms, if these were on average the most fee-sensitive clients at their 
original firms, their departure would have reduced the average fee sensitivity of clients at 
the other firms, increasing the optimal price.  It is also possible that the increased 
regulatory activity of the past two years increased marginal (as opposed to fixed or sunk) 
costs and that this offset the effects of any greater fee sensitivity.   
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Downward regulatory pressure on price, whether via the direct regulation of 
prices as in natural monopoly industries such as electricity or cable television or via 
indirect measures such as those proposed by the NYAG, is generally considered to have 
several potential side effects.  First, if product quality is non-contractable and thus cannot 
also be regulated, price regulation can lead to lower-than-efficient levels of quality.  For 
example, price regulation may encourage funds to substitute cheaper anonymous 
managers for more expensive star managers.  Massa, Reuter, and Zitzewitz (2006) report 
that a trend toward anonymous team management is already in progress (driven, they 
                                                 
39  For funds reporting assets and expense ratios in both 2002 and 2004, the average expense ratio 
(weighted by 2002 assets) was 74.0 basis points and 73.6 basis points in 2004.    
31 argue, by a desire to avoid competition for star managers from the booming hedge fund 
industry) and that anonymous teams manage less actively (as proxied by portfolio 
turnover) and produce slightly lower returns. 
Alternatively, fund managers have other means of charging shareholders for their 
services, outside of the expense ratio.  For example, rather than seeking out lower 
“execution only” commissions, they can place stock trades at brokers who provide a 
benefits to the advisor.  Examples of these benefits can be allocations of IPO (Reuter, 
2006) which are not always allocated to the funds whose trading produced them (Gaspar, 
Massa, and Matos, 2005).  Sales support for the advisor’s funds, or “soft dollar” credits 
that are officially supposed to be used to finance purchases of research, but in practice 
have been used for office space, periodical subscriptions, computer equipment, and travel 
expenses.  Benefits can also be given by the broker to the advisors’ employees; the 
recently alleged excessive gift giving by Jefferies Securities to Fidelity employees 
provides an example.
40  Fund advisors can also divert shareholder assets by allowing 
stale price arbitrage trading in their funds, by engaging in cross trades between portfolios 
at systematically advantageous prices, and by front running personal or favored-portfolio 
assets ahead of mutual fund trades.  Most of these devices are either illegal or at least 
discouraged by regulators, but nevertheless, at least in principle one might worry that 
downward regulatory pressure on prices leads advisors to increase their use. 
 A second consequence of downward price regulation can be shortages.  For 
mutual funds, which have high fixed costs at the firm level but low marginal costs, a 
“shortage” is most likely to take the form of a reduction in efforts to sell funds to 
                                                 
40  See, for example, Craig, Susanne and John Hechinger, “Entertaining Excess:  Fishing for Fidelity 
Business, One Firm Employed Lavish Bait,” Wall Street Journal, 8/12/2005, p. A1. 
32 shareholders with small account sizes.  For investors who would not find their way to a 
less-aggressive marketer of (lower cost) funds, but would instead invest in cash-
equivalents such as bank deposits, this could lead to a welfare loss resulting from a lower 
than optimal exposure to equity markets. 
This is, however, a commonly made argument that is easy to overstate.  
Expectations of the future equity premium that are derived from current valuations are 
lower than the historical U.S. return premium commonly cited by industry.  For example, 
Fama and French (2002) estimate a forward-looking equity premium of 2.5 to 4.3 percent 
as compared with a 7.4 percent premium calculated from historical returns.  Suppose that 
the individual we are concerned is a canonical mean-variance investor faced with 
dividing her portfolio between riskless cash/bonds at the risk-free rate and equities with 
normally distributed returns and a 3.4 percent (pre-expense) expected premium (taking 
Fama and French’s midpoint).  Suppose also that, if she can invest at comparable cost in 
either asset, she will want to hold an approximately market portfolio of 50 percent 
equities and 50 percent cash/bonds.  It is straightforward to show that an advisor who 
places this investor in a 50-50 portfolio, but charges her 0.85 percent of her assets 
annually for the service, leaves her as well off in certainty-equivalent utility terms as if 
she had invested costlessly in cash on her own.
41  By comparison, the asset-weighted 
average expense ratio for “C class” shares for 2004 from the CRSP Mutual Funds dataset 
                                                 
41  The certainty equivalent utility of a mean-variance investor who invests s of their assets in a risky asset 
with normally distribution returns and 1 – s in the risk-free asset is given by w[(1 + f) + sp – s
2rv – e], 
where w is initial wealth, f is the risk-free rate, p is the expected equity premium, v is the variance of risk 
asset returns, r is a risk aversion parameter, and e is the expense ratio paid.  For s = 0.5 to be optimal, p 
must equal rv.  Assuming a p of 3.4 percent, s = 0.5 and e = 0.85 percent yields the same utility as s = e = 
0.   
33 is 1.75 percent.
42  Given these fees and expectations about the equity premium, it is hard 
to argue that the typical advisor is offering better certainty-equivalent utility than a bank 
CD that pays the risk-free rate.    
A third, related consequence of downward price regulation can be exit.  The 
increase in regulatory scrutiny in the last few years has increased fixed (as well as sunk) 
costs for mutual fund families and has probably also reduced the use of some of the non-
expense-ratio sources of revenue described above.  Thus one might expect some pressure 
for consolidation in the longer-run, but perhaps surprisingly there is not much evidence of 
this yet.  The number of unique management companies offering funds capture by the 
CRSP Dataset has declined from 598 in 2000 to 564 in 2004, but 75 percent of this 
decline was from 2001 to 2002 and thus was presumably more related to the stock market 
decline than to increased regulatory pressure. 
The welfare costs of fund advisor exit depend crucially on what one assumes 
about consumer behavior.  If we assume that consumers would like to maximize the risk-
adjusted returns on their investments but do so imperfectly due to information and 
cognitive limitations, then we can analyze welfare by examining the implications of exit 
for shareholder returns.  The firms most likely to be induced to exit by downward 
regulatory pressure on price are small, high-expense ratio firms, and studies of the 
determinants of fund returns find that these firms produce the lowest returns, even before 
deducting expenses (e.g., Carhart, 1997).  This suggests that in the mutual-fund context, 
                                                 
42  C class shares are advisor-sold, but compensate the advisor using a 12b1 fee that is included in the 
expense ratio, rather than using a front or back-end load.  I focus on C shares since calculating the total 
annual fees paid to both fund manager and advisor does not require an assumption about holding period.  
Given their asset-weighted average loads and expense ratios of 5.0 percent and 0.93 percent, one would 
reach a similar conclusion about the overall fee levels of A shares if one assumed a holding period of 6 
years. 
34 regulatory-induced exit can be good for consumers.  On the other hand, if consumers are 
fully rational and have perfect information about ex-ante expected returns, then any fund 
they buy or continue to hold must be welfare-maximizing for them.
43  The exit of a fund 
firm deprives its clients of their first choice and thus, by assumption, must reduce the 
welfare of these consumers.   
Of course, even if one views returns as an adequate proxy for shareholder welfare, 
one might still have concerns about policies that induce exit and raise the minimum-
required scale for entry in an industry.  An increase in industry concentration might 
reduce competitive intensity in the industry, although concentration in this industry is low 
enough that one might not expect the exit of a small number of high-cost firms to 
significantly affect behavior. 
On the other hand, increased entry barriers might also limit the future entry of 
innovative firms.  The importance of this effect depends on the extent to which one views 
the industry as mature.  Mutual funds appear to be relatively mature.  A comparison of 
the ranking of top mutual fund families in terms of assets in the CRSP Mutual Funds 
database in 1992 and 2004 suggests that there has been little turnover (Table 5).  Six of 
the top 7 in 1992 were also in the top 7 in 2004 (Evergreen has replaced Merrill Lynch), 
although the order of families 3-7 has changed slightly.  Among the top 20 firms in 2004, 
Schwab and Barclays are the only firms that have moved up the rankings significantly 
other than through mergers.  Hedge funds, in contrast, have experienced extremely rapid 
growth during this time period.   
                                                 
43  For example, one reason why a customer might rationally buy high-expense funds with low ex-ante 
expected returns is if the quality of services that are bundled with the fund are high.  Collins (2005) argues 
that differences in service quality explain the price dispersion in index fund expense ratios reported on by 
Busse, Elton, and Gruber (2004) and Hortascu and Syverson (2005).   
35 [Insert Table 5 here] 
 
6.  Antitrust 
 The best known financial services antitrust case is undoubtedly the case against 
the Nasdaq market makers in the mid-1990s.  The case was initiated after Christie and 
Schultz (1994) reported that odd-eighths quotations (i.e., a market market offering to 
trade a stock at 47 1/8 instead of 47 or 47 ¼) were extremely rare for a subset of Nasdaq 
stocks.  After an investigation, the Department of Justice alleged that the avoidance of 
odd-eighths quotes was collusive behavior designed to increase average market maker 
spreads. 
Several features of market making may have facilitated collusion.  First, market 
makers observe each other’s price quotations; cheating against any collusive arrangement 
would thus be readily detected.  Second, avoiding odd-eighths was a focal arrangement 
that allowed for a distribution of quantity while minimizing the need for conferring.  
Avoiding odd-eighths quotations was particularly focal given that the minimum tick size 
on Nasdaq had only recently been reduced from one-quarter.  Third, under preferencing 
agreements with sources of order flow (e.g., brokerages), many market makers had the 
right to handle any order flow at the current best bid and ask prices offered by any other 
market maker (the National Best Bid and Offer, or NBBO).  This functioned as a “meet-
or-release” clause; so long as the preferred market maker was willing to match, a market 
maker who undercut the current NBBO could not attract any of the preferenced order 
flow.  This significantly reduced the returns to “cheating” on any collusive arrangement.  
Fourth, market makers competed in multiple markets, so cheating in one market could be 
36 punished in another.  As Christie and Schultz (1995) discuss, an early response to an odd-
eighths quotation was often a phone call to the traders’ boss, where such punishments 
were reportedly explicitly threatened. 
In addition, the average retail investors’ understanding of the bid-ask spread 
component of transaction costs was limited, and many of the institutional investment 
managers, who presumably did understand bids and asks, had business units that were 
beneficiaries of any collusion.  Furthermore, the rents from collusion were shared through 
a system known as payment for order flow.  In exchange for signing the above-mentioned 
preferencing agreements, sources of order flow (such as brokerages) received per share 
payments.  Table 6 shows minimum tick sizes and average gross trading revenue and 
order flow payments per share for 1995-2003 for Knight Securities, the largest publicly 
traded pure-play market maker.  In 1995-96, Knight paid about one-third of its trading 
revenue for order flow. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
As a result of the antitrust enforcement action, odd-eighths avoidance was 
abandoned, reducing the effective minimum tick size for stocks were there had been 
collusion.  The collusion case also focused attention on the effects of tick size on 
investor’s transaction costs and further reductions in minimum tick size followed, to 6.25 
cents in June 1997 and to 1 cent in early 2001.  As predicted by models such as Kandel 
and Marx (1998) that emphasized minimum tick size as source of market maker rents and 
payment for order flow, tick size reductions have reduced both market market 
profitability and order flow payments (Table 6). 
37   Another market in which price transparency and multi-market contact potentially 
facilitate collusion is in underwriting and syndicated lending.  Placing a new issue into 
the market requires access to a broad network of potential investors, especially since 
issuers prefer to place it with investors more likely to hold long-term.  As a result, several 
investment banks are usually required to manage and market an offering.  Underwriting 
fees are typically a whole-number percentage of the funds raised (e.g., 7 percent for an 
initial equity offering, 3 percent for high-yield debt).  Underwriting business is reportedly 
extremely profitable for the bank, and competition for it is typically hard fought, but 
nevertheless discounts from the standard underwriting fees are rare.  Any underwriter 
who secured business through discounting underwriting fees would be unable to do so in 
secret, since underwriting fees are disclosed in offering documents.  The amount of extra 
business an underwriter could gain through discounting would be limited by the issuer’s 
desire for wide distribution.  And competing banks could punish the discounter, by 
encouraging clients to exclude the discounter from other syndicates and by encouraging 
brokerage clients and asset managers (including any asset managers within the same 
firm) to avoid purchasing an issue whose underwriting business was obtained by 
discounting.
44
The difficulties of discounting underwriting fees lead banks to compete along 
other dimensions.  For example, issuers will demand that banks bundle low-margin 
products such as revolving credit lines to obtain the higher-margin underwriting business.  
                                                 
44  Some have argued that institutional investors avoided buying Goggle when it was offered because of 
their use of a Dutch auction process and a small number of underwriters and their negotiation of a 3 percent 
underwriting fee.  Although Google used a modified Dutch auction that allowed it to price its shares below 
the market clearing price, creating an incentive for investors to participate in the offering, investment banks 
may have viewed a successful Dutch auction as a threat, since if it become the common mode of offering it 
would reduce the importance of underwriters’ distribution networks. 
38 Alternatively, commercial banks will demand inclusion in investment banking business 
as a condition of their lending.  The latter practice is known as “tying,” and the NASD 
has argued that it violates the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, which 
prohibit banks from extending credit on the condition that borrowers engage in other 
business with the bank.  Commercial banks have in turn argued this form of tying is 
actually pro-competitive in that it creates a non-price means of competing for 
underwriting business. 
Other forms of non-price competition for underwriting business have allegedly 
included biases in analyst opinion and even presumably illegal bribes of management.  
Investment banks have also been accused of biasing their analyst coverage in order to win 
underwriting business, which would help explain the correlation between analysts 
opinions and their firm’s investment banking business found by Lin and McNichols 
(1998) and Michaely and Womack (1999).  In the “spinning” cases, banks such as Credit 
Suisse First Boston were accused of allocating shares in underpriced IPOs to executives 
of firms in order to win their underwriting business. 
Another example of collusion on one dimension of price being at least partly 
undone by competition on other dimensions is the pre-1975 era of fixed commissions.  In 
the Buttonwood Tree Agreement of 1792 that formed the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), the NYSE members agreed on minimum commissions:  “We the Subscribers, 
Brokers for the Purchase and Sale of Public Stock, do hereby solemnly promise and 
pledge ourselves to each other, that we will not buy or sell from this day for any person 
whatsoever, any kind of Public Stock at a less rate than one-quarter percent Commission 
39 ….”
45  The NYSE and, after its 1908 founding, the American Stock Exchange 
maintained fixed commission structures.  The 1934 Act gave the SEC oversight of 
brokerage commissions, but under the guise of self-regulation, the Commission allowed 
the exchanges to exercise their authority over commissions. 
   Agreements on commissions only applied to trades on the stock exchanges, but 
the exchanges prohibited their members from off-exchange trading.  Nevertheless “third 
market” firms developed that specialized in handling off-exchange block trades for 
institutional investors at discounted commissions.  This resulted in undesirable market 
fragmentation, leading the SEC to first press the exchanges to offer quantity discounts 
and then, in 1971, to require that commissions on large orders be set competitively (the 
ceiling was set at $500,000 in April 1971 and lowered to $300,000 in April 1972).  The 
deregulation of large-trade commissions helped motivate a class of small investors to 
bring a class-action antitrust suit alleging that fixed commissions were price fixing in 
violation of the Sherman Act.  In Gordon v. NYSE (1975), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
that since the 1934 Act had explicitly given the SEC authority to regulate commissions, 
this superceded the antitrust laws.  The decision was quickly made moot however, by the 
fact that commissions were deregulated in 1975 by Congress (via the aforementioned 
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975) and the SEC. 
During the era of fixed commissions, brokers engaged in non-price competition 
by offering free research.  In addition, institutional clients would negotiate “give ups,” 
where, in lieu of a discount, a portion of their commission would be paid to another 
broker who in turn provided the investor with free services (such as research or computer 
                                                 
45  F. Eames, The New York Stock Exchange 14 (1968 edition), quoted in Gordon v. New York Stock 
Exchange (1975). 
40 services).  A group of third-party research firms developed who earned most of their 
revenue from these give ups.  At the time of commission deregulation, these third-party 
firms feared that investment managers’ fiduciary duties would prevent them from paying 
commissions large enough to finance “give ups” and that managers would be unwilling to 
pay for research directly.  In response to lobbying by asset managers and third-party 
research firms, Congress added a safe harbor, allowing asset managers to pay above 
market commissions if they determine that the commission was reasonable given the 
combined brokerage and research services provided.  “Give ups” were renamed “soft 
dollars” but their economic purpose changed.  They were no longer a form of non-price 
competition that undermined fixed commissions, but instead become a device for asset 
managers to use client assets to purchase research (and other services) through a less 
transparent means than including its cost in the expense ratio.
46
A consequence of the Gordon decision is that the extent to which the Securities 
Acts preempt the antitrust laws with respect to the securities industry is uncertain and 
depends crucially on the specific issue at hand.  This question is important in part because 
regulatory capture theory would predict that enforcement of anti-trust related issues by a 
multi-industry regulator (like the DOJ or FTC) to be more aggressive than buy a single-
industry (like the SEC).  In Gordon, the court found that Congress had explicitly 
discussed the stock exchanges’ fixed commission agreements when writing the 1934 Act, 
and that their decision to give the SEC primary regulatory authority over commissions 
carried an implied antitrust immunity (Coffee and Seligman, 2002, p. 646).  In contrast, 
in the Nasdaq Market Makers case brought by the Department of Justice, which alleged 
                                                 
46  While most discussions of soft dollars find this problematic (e.g., Siggelkow, 2004), Horan and 
Johansen (2004) argue that the ability of managers to pass on the costs of research in a less-than-transparent 
manner is beneficial, in that it offsets what would otherwise be an incentive to underinvest in research. 
41 practices that were not discussed by Congress when delegating authority to the SEC, the 
courts did not find that the antitrust laws were preempted. 
          
7.  Conflicts of interest and boundaries of firms 
“We have turned conflicts of interest into synergies.” Jack Grubman, former 
telecom analyst at Citigroup, in an email, as quoted by Eliot Spitzer. 
The proceeding discussion highlights some of the advantages for a firm 
participating in multiple financial services businesses.  Many financial products are 
complements, and integrated providers should have incentives to provide them on more 
attractive terms for the usual reason (the elimination of double marginalization).  There 
are also no doubt considerable synergies on the production side.  Integration may make 
otherwise collusive markets more competitive, as if there is tacit collusion on one 
dimension of price, providing related products can increase ones ability to engage in non-
price competition.  For example, a brokerage salesforce and research department give 
investment banks an advantage in competing for underwriting business, while the deposit 
base needed to finance lower-margin bank loans does the same for commercial banks. 
At the same time, there are reasons for integration that are less benign from a 
regulatory perspective.  Acting as an agent in industry A may create the opportunity to 
bias ones actions in order to generate business benefits in industry B, potentially at the 
expense of the industry-A client.  For example, asset managers can use their power to 
vote shareholder proxies as leverage in obtaining underwriting or other business (Davis 
and Kim, 2007).  In-house brokers or financial advisors can help sell an asset manager’s 
funds instead of lower-fee or better-run alternatives.  An in-house broker can allow an 
asset manager to internalize the benefit of commissions for trades done on behalf of their 
42 client, perhaps creating an incentive to over trade a portfolio.  In-house proprietary 
traders may be able to benefit from a brokerage or investment management business, by 
illegally front-running client portfolio trades, stepping in front of client limit orders,
47 or 
otherwise exploiting information gained from clients’ trading activities.  In-house 
proprietary trading can also benefit from improved execution quality resulting from the 
bundling of informed proprietary trading order flow with the presumably less-informed 
order flow from client’s brokerage accounts or large managed portfolios, at the cost of 
worse execution for the less-informed orders.  Furthermore, when punishing firms that 
defect against standard industry practices, it is helpful to be able to do so in multiple lines 
of business. 
Most of this second category of synergies also represent conflicts of interest.
48  
These conflicts involve the tradeoff of one client’s interests for the interests of either 
another, favored, client or the firm itself.  In some cases, this tradeoff of interests can be 
accomplished across firm boundaries through explicit payments.  For example, “directed 
brokerage” was used as a substitute for fund selling by in-house brokers, and soft dollars, 
especially if used for non-research expenses, can be used to allow asset managers to 
internalize the profits from portfolio trading commissions.  But bringing these tradeoffs 
inside firm boundaries is helpful for several reasons.  First, it eliminates the need for 
explicit payments that are potentially subject to regulatory or client scrutiny.  Second, 
common ownership can provide a credible commitment to clients expecting favoritism 
                                                 
47  Suppose a client submits a limit order to buy at stock at $47.00 or better.  A broker can “step in front” of 
this order buy placing a limit order to buy at $47.01.  If the broker’s order is filled, the broker has the 
option to either hold the order and gain any market appreciation or, if demand for the stock weakens, sell to 
the client at $47.00.   
48  For a useful taxonomy of conflicts of interest within and across financial services business lines, see 
Walter (2005). 
43 that a contractual-relationship might not.  For example, an underwriting client expecting 
favorable opinions from an analyst is likely to be more assured of getting them if the 
analyst and the investment banker are employee of the same firm, as opposed to simply 
having a business relationship.  Likewise, clients may invest in hedge funds run side-by-
side with mutual funds because they expect the differences in fee structures to produce 
favoritism in their favor.  Especially if hedge fund investors are more cognizant of the 
potential for such favoritism than mutual fund investors, firms running funds side by side 
may realize net marketing advantages. 
Ironically, it was precisely these conflicts of interest that motivated the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933, which legally separated banking, securities, and insurance.  While 
reversing the 1999 repeal of Glass-Steagall is not being widely contemplated, the trend 
toward convergence that the repeal reflected has certainly slowed, and perhaps even 
begun a reversal.  In the Summer of 2005, Citigroup swapped its asset management 
business for Legg Mason’s brokerage business.  The stated reason for the deal was to 
eliminate the regulatory risks arising from common ownership of asset management and 
brokerage.  It remains to be seen whether this deal will begin a broader trend. 
 
8.  Conclusion        
         Financial regulation has been basically reactive in the last decade.  Both Sarbanes-
Oxley and many of the significant SEC rules have been adopted in response to 
revelations of specific abuses, such as accounting fraud, mutual fund late trading, 
selective disclosure, insider trading, and market maker collusion.  Even the most 
noteworthy deregulation, the gradual relaxation and finally repeal of the Glass-Steagall 
44 Act, was partly a response to a series of mergers between the industries the Act was 
designed to keep separate.  Given the increasing emphasis on compliance in most 
financial services firms in the last few years, the rate of revelation of new scandals is 
likely to slow.  This should create the opportunity to think more proactively about what 
financial regulation should be attempting to accomplish. 
As discussed in Sections 2 and 3, many investors pay a financial planner to sell 
them a mutual fund or annuity, pay the fund manager management and administration 
fees, and pay commissions and transactions costs for active management that is, on 
average, both aggressive and unsuccessful in generating positive risk-adjusted returns.  
Perhaps the largest and most controversial outstanding question about financial regulation 
is whether this represents an efficient market outcome or a market failure, and, if the 
latter, whether regulation should do more to correct that failure. 
If one decides that it should, the next question would be how:  how to change 
laws to correct existing market failures without creating new ones, and how to reform 
institutions so that they reinforce rather than undermine this goal.  The first question is 
non-trivial.  Disclosure about fees and conflicts of interest appears ineffective in 
influencing the behavior of many investors.  On fees, the strengthening of mutual fund 
boards’ fiduciary responsibilities to aggressively negotiate on investors’ behalf also does 
not appear to have led to a significant reduction, at least in the short term.  This raises the 
question of whether more direct regulation of price levels is desirable, either through 
outright price limits or through the strengthening of suitability requirements for broker 
recommendations.  This hinges in large part on whether it could be implemented without 
the side effects that accompany it in other contexts. 
45 But the more difficult question is arguably the institutional one.  Both the 
approach of self-regulatory delegation and the staffing model for the SEC lead these 
institutions to reflect the interests of the industries they regulate.  These interests may be 
well aligned with the public interest in disciplining the behavior of rogue individuals, but 
are likely to be much less so in correcting systemic market failures that are also sources 
of economic rents.  Both the contrast with Eliot Spitzer over the last few years and the 
aggressive prosecution of the Nasdaq price fixing case by the DOJ in the 1990s suggest 
that multi-industry regulators might be less prone to capture.  The SEC is currently 
organized around the industries it regulates, and while this specialization is no doubt 
useful for building industry expertise, a more generalist-oriented staffing model, in which 
staff develop expertise that creates future employment opportunities in multiple parts of 
the securities industry, may reduce at least some of the forces contributing to capture.  
A second large and controversial question is whether regulation should continue 
to encourage, or instead discourage or attempt to reverse, convergence.  Many financial 
services are complements in both their production and consumption, and convergence 
should allow for many genuine synergies:  in production, product innovation, the 
reduction of search costs via one-stop shopping, and the potential elimination of double 
marginalization.  At the same time, the presence of agency relationships in most services 
means that convergence may frustrate the policing of conflicts of interest by bringing 
them inside firm boundaries.  Do the problems associated with convergence outweigh the 
benefits?  Research enumerating and economically sizing them would be especially 
helpful in answering this question. 
46 A third large question is whether policy should encourage single or competing 
regulatory regimes.  In particular, should more and less stringent regimes be allowed to 
exist side-by-side, with issuer and investor choice, or would such competition risk a “race 
to the bottom?”  Romano (2001) argues that issuers should have more flexibility in 
choosing between national regulatory regimes.  Indeed, Hubbard and Thornton (2006) 
argue that increased regulatory compliance costs in the U.S., partly due to SOX, is 
leading some issuers to avoid U.S. listings, suggesting that this competition has begun in 
earnest.  Variable annuity subaccounts, 529 college savings plans, and hedge funds avoid 
varying amounts of the regulation faced by mutual funds.  For variable annuity 
subaccounts and 529 plans, this is primarily thought to result in higher fees, which makes 
these products more attractive to sell but less attractive to investors.  Hedge funds also 
have considerably more flexibility in short selling and leverage and in basing fees on 
performance, which offers at least potential benefits for investors as well as firms.  Inter-
product competition may cause mutual fund regulation to have the unintended 
consequence of diverting firm selling effort and consumer interest into less regulated 
products.  Finally, one could envisage the reinvigoration of state securities regulation 
leading to competing regimes within the U.S., where some firms opt out of the more 
stringent regulation provided by a state such as New York (perhaps by locating outside 
New York and refusing to sell to its residents), and where investors perhaps draw 
inferences from their decisions to do so.   
As the length and recentness the bibliography that follows demonstrates, the post-
bubble years have seen the popular interest in refining financial regulation matched by 
academic interest.  Like policy, academic research is often reactive, exemplified by the 
47 many papers that usually follow a major policy change such as SOX or Regulation Fair 
Disclosure.  By helping policy makers understand the economics of the securities 
business, including the nature of competition and the incentives faced by firms and 
agents, however, academic research can help policy makers prospectively identify 
changes that would lead to better outcomes.  Competition, incentives, and the effects of 
regulation are central issues in industrial organization (IO).  While research in and debate 
about securities regulation is often dominated by specialists, given the centrality of what 
are essentially IO issues, the generalist readers of this volume are likely to also have a 
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55 Table 1.  Relative sizes of financial services and health care, 2003
Percent of GDP
Gross value added 
in Financial 
Intermediation
Gross value added 





United States 8.1% 6.9% 15.0%
Equal-weighted average of rest of G-7 5.1% 5.9% 9.2%
Canada 5.9% 5.4% 9.9%
France 4.3% 7.6% 10.1%
Germany 3.8% 6.1% 11.1%
Italy 5.4% 4.5% 8.4%
Japan 7.0% NA 7.9%
United Kingdom 4.4% 5.9% 7.7%
Sources:  OECD National Accounts for value added; OECD Health Data for total health care expenditures.  National 
accounts data is from 2001 for Canada and the UK; health expenditure data is for 2002 for Japan and the UK.Table 2.  Size of U.S. financial intermediation industries, 2002
Revenue Payroll Employees
($ millions) ($ millions) (thousands)
52 Finance & insurance  2,732,546 377,236 6,534
521 Monetary authorities - central bank  28,909 1,234 22
522 Credit intermediation & related activities  1,061,126 148,211 3,229
5221 Depository credit intermediation  598,871 97,143 2,220
52211 Commercial banking  481,231 79,924 1,748
52212 Savings institutions  78,840 10,311 255
52213 Credit unions  37,397 6,503 211
52219 Other depository credit intermediation  1,404 404 5
5222 403,913 36,617 690
5223 58,342 14,451 319
523 Securities intermediation & related activities  325,184 105,549 869
52311 Investment banking & securities dealing  104,011 31,486 143
52312 Securities brokerage  104,812 36,428 361
52313 Commodity contracts dealing  3,905 835 10
52314 Commodity contracts brokerage  2,881 1,045 12
5232 Securities & commodity exchanges  3,213 721 7
5239 Other financial investment activities  106,363 35,034 336
52391 Miscellaneous intermediation  10,359 3,054 29
52392 Portfolio management  65,483 22,244 181
52393 Investment advice  15,098 5,473 67
52399 All other financial investment activities  15,423 4,263 59
524 Insurance carriers & related activities  1,294,941 120,683 2,387
52593 Real Estate Investment Trusts - REITs  22,386 1,559 26
Nondepository credit intermediation (credit 
card issuers, leasing, etc.)
Activities related to credit intermediation (loan 
brokerage, transaction processing, etc.)
NAICS 
code
Source:  2002 Economic Census.  The economic census includes only REITs from NAICS code 525, excluding, 
for example pension funds. Table 3.  Revenue of U.S. commercial banks and securities firms by product, 2002














Banking products 419,611 1,081 113 1,771 422,576
550 Loan income 324,557 1,081 113 1,771 327,522
552 Non-loan credit products 32,571 32,571
570 Deposit accounts 38,456 38,456
571 Cash management 21,783 21,783
572,573
2,244 2,244
Securities products 88,021 89,880 100,472 100,428 378,800
Securities origination 4,353 11,680 2,362 357 18,754
5531 Public equity 3,400 5,256 1,556 177 10,389
5532 Public debt 849 5,085 584 109 6,627
5533 Private placement equity 13 630 84 69 796
5534 Private placement debt 92 709 138 2 942
Brokering and dealing 42,415 48,618 78,480 7,071 176,584
554 Debt instruments 29,429 8,932 12,199 1,427 51,988
556 Equity 1,723 27,948 51,474 3,502 84,647
557 Derivatives 6,324 3,758 2,615 543 13,241
559 Mutual funds 1,298 200 8,004 585 10,087
558, 560, 561
400 126 797 238 1,560
562 to 564
3,241 7,654 3,392 775 15,061
Proprietary trading 17,715 17,299 3,438 2,463 40,915
565 Debt instruments 12,675 11,950 552 556 25,733
566 Equities 905 2,104 658 850 4,518
567 Derivatives 2,739 2,636 2,112 313 7,800
568,569 Other 1,397 610 115 743 2,864
Trust, asset management, and financial planning 21,727 12,215 15,699 88,659 138,300
574 Trust fiduciary fees 14,098 135 116 10,559 24,909
577 Financial planning and investment management    7,629 12,080 15,583 78,100 113,391
5771 Businesses and governments 4,691 7,652 3,446 26,164 41,954
5772 Individuals 2,937 4,428 12,137 51,935 71,437
Other products 93,049 13,175 4,719 6,042 116,986
575,576 Financial market clearing products and ACH 1,810 125 493 1,878 4,305
578 Other products 91,239 13,050 4,227 4,164 112,681
Total 598,871 104,011 104,812 106,363 914,057
Source:  2002 Economic Census
Document payment products (i.e., cashier's checks, 
money orders) and retail forex
Financing related to securities (securities lending, 
repurchase agreements)
Product line code
Other products (currency, commodity pools, 




revenue Total net assets
Asset-weighted 
average expense 
ratio (basis points) Market share
2002
Fidelity 4,428 661,017 67.0 11.6%
Vanguard 1,446 572,428 25.3 10.1%
American funds 2,551 332,904 76.6 5.9%
Rest of industry 33,585 4,118,602 81.5 72.4%
Total 42,010 5,684,951 73.9 100%
2004
Fidelity 6,455 913,209 70.7 15.4%
Vanguard 2,133 889,955 24.0 15.0%
American funds 5,178 650,119 79.6 10.9%
Rest of industry 30,313 3,487,608 86.9 58.7%
Total 44,079 5,940,891 74.2 100%
Notes:
1.  Data is from the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Funds Database
3.  Expense ratio revenue is the expense ratio reported in the CRSP multiplied by total net assets.
2.  Total net asset figures are the latest quarter available in the quarterly attributes file.  For 2004, 
about one-third of the data is from the third rather than the fourth quarter.Table 5.  Mutual fund families ranked by assets, 1992 and 2004
Rank Firm Assets in millions, 2004 Rank in 1992
1 Fidelity Management Research 913,209 1
2 Vanguard Group Investment Co. 889,955 2
3 Capital Research & Management Co. 650,119 5
4 Franklin Advisers Inc. 159,478 6
5 Evergreen Investment Mgmt Company Inc. 151,759 76
6 Federated Investment Management Co 146,990 7
7 Dreyfus Corporation 137,424 4
8 Barclays Global Fund Advisors 137,177 131
9 Charles Schwab Investment Mgmt Inc. 135,962 26
10 Wells Fargo Bank 120,995 63Table 6.  Minimum tick size, payment for order flow, and market making profits at Knight Securities
Cents per share traded
Year Minimum Tick Size
Market maker trading 
revenue
Payment for Order 
Flow
Order flow payment share 
of revenue
1995 12.5 1.47 0.55 37%
1996 12.5 1.71 0.65 38%
1997
Reduced from 12.5  
to 6.25 in June
1.45 0.37
26%
1998 6.25 1.03 0.21 21%
1999 6.25 1.04 0.17 16%
2000 6.25 1.03 0.16 15%
2001 1 0.32 0.06 19%
2002 1 0.15 0.03 22%
2003 1 0.09 0.01 15%






















Note:  Mentions for 2006 are annualized using data from the first half of the year.Figure 2.  The Retail Securities and Investments Value Chain
Origination:  underwriting and distribution ($19 billion)
Proprietary trading ($41 billion)
Brokerage and research ($201 billion)
Financial advisors ($67 billion) Supermarkets
Figures are annual revenue by product line for commercial banks (NAICS 5221) and securities firms (NAICS 523) taken from Table 3.  Product codes are assigned to the 
categories above as follows:  origination = product code 533, proprietary trading = 565-569, brokerage and research = 554 to 564 and the other product categories (575, 
576, and 578 for securities firms only), fund management and financial advisors = 574 + 577.  The revenue from product code 577 (investment management and advice 
giving) is allocated according to the industry classification of the establishment, revenue from portfolio management and investment banking establishments is called "fund 
management" and revenue from other industries (largely commercial banking, brokerage, and investment advising establishments) is classified as financial advice. 
Variable 
annuities Fund management ($71 billion) Retail 


















































































Note:  Figures for 2005 and 2006 are budgeted, not actual.